Description du livre
This book examines the strategies adopted by local governments to obtain excess construction land quotas in the face of the central government’s strict land management system. It applies game theory, principal-agent theory, collective action theory, and competition and collusion theory to analyze the trade-offs and constraints faced by local governments under the existing institutional framework. It also empirically tests the imitative competitive strategy of land violation and the institutional collusion strategy of land development rights trading using spatial panel model and Tobit model. The book reveals the internal mechanism behind local governments’ simultaneous adoption of competitive and collusive strategies in pursuing local interests and economic growth. It also shows how local governments’ land violations have significant strategic characteristics in time and space, and how economic development gap, resource endowment gap, and human network relationship influence their collusion formation in land development rights trading. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature on land management, local governance, and political economy in China. It is suitable for scholars, students, policy makers, and practitioners who are interested in understanding the complex dynamics of land development in China. The book is written in an accessible and engaging style, with clear explanations of theoretical concepts and empirical methods.